[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
entities in a source domain and entities in a target domain.
" When those fixed correspondences are activated, mappings can project
source domain inference patterns onto target domain inference patterns.
" Metaphorical mappings obey the Invariance Principle: The image-schema
structure of the source domain is projected onto the target domain in a way
that is consistent with inherent target domain structure.
" Mappings are not arbitrary, but grounded in the body and in everyday
experience and knowledge.
" A conceptual system contains thousands of conventional metaphorical
mappings, which form a highly structured subsystem of the conceptual
system.
" There are two types of mappings: conceptual mappings and image-
mappings; both obey the Invariance Principle.
Some Aspects of Metaphor
" The system of conventional conceptual metaphor is mostly unconscious,
automatic, and is used with no noticeable effort, just like our linguistic
system and the rest of our conceptual system.
" Our system of conventional metaphor is alive in the same sense that our
system of grammatical and phonological rules is alive; namely, it is
constantly in use, automatically and below the level of consciousness.
" Our metaphor system is central to our understanding of experience and to
the way we act on that understanding.
" Conventional mappings are static correspondences, and are not, in
themselves, algorithmic in nature. However, this by no means rules out the
possibility that such static correspondences might be used in language
processing that involves sequential steps.
" Metaphor is mostly based on correspondences in our experiences, rather
than on similarity.
" The metaphor system plays a major role in both the grammar and lexicon
of a language.
" Metaphorical mappings vary in universality; some seem to be universal,
others are widespread, and some seem to be culture- specific.
" Poetic metaphor is, for the most part, an extension of our everyday,
conventional system of metaphorical thought.
These are the conclusions that best fit the empirical studies of metaphor conducted
over the past decade or so. Though much of it is inconsistent with traditional
views, it is by no means all new, and some ideas-e.g., that abstract concepts are
comprehended in terms of concrete concepts-have a long history.
Concluding Remarks
The evidence supporting the contemporary theory of metaphor is voluminous and
grows larger each year as more research in the field is done. The evidence, as we
saw above, comes from five domains:
" Generalizations over polysemy
" Generalization over inference patterns
" Generalizations over extensions to poetic cases
" Generalizations over semantic change
" Psycholinguistic experiments
I have discussed only a handful of examples of the first three of these, hopefully
enough to make the reader curious about the field. But evidence is convincing
only if it can count as evidence. When does evidence fail to be evidence?
Unfortunately, all too often. It is commonly the case that certain fields of inquiry
are defined by assumptions that rule out the possibility of counterevidence. When
a defining assumption of a field comes up against evidence, the evidence usually
loses: the practitioners of the field must ignore the evidence if they want to keep
the assumptions that define the field they are committed to. Part of what makes the
contemporary theory of metaphor so interesting is that the evidence for it
contradicts the defining assumptions of so many academic disciplines. In my
opinion, this should make one doubt the defining assumptions of all those
disciplines. The reason is this: The defining assumptions of the contemporary
theory of metaphor are minimal. There are only two. The Generalization
Commitment: To seek generalizations in all areas of language, including
polysemy, patterns of inference, novel metaphor, and semantic change. The
Cognitive Commitment: To take experimental evidence seriously. But these are
nothing more than commitments to the scientific study of language and the mind.
No initial commitment is made as to the form of an answer to the question of what
is metaphor. However, the defining assumptions of other fields do often entail a
commitment about the form of an answer to that question. It is useful, in an
interdisciplinary volume of this sort, to spell out exactly what those defining
assumptions are, since they will often explain why different authors reach such
different conclusions about the nature of metaphor.
Literal Meaning Commitments
I started this Chapter with a list of the false assumptions about literal meaning that
are commonly made. These assumptions are, of course, false only relative to the
kinds of evidence that supports the contemporary theory of metaphor. If one
ignores all such evidence, then the assumptions can be maintained without
contradiction. Assumptions about literality are the locus of many of the
contradictions between the contemporary theory of metaphor and various
academic disciplines. Let us review those assumptions. In the discussion of literal
meaning given above, I observed that it is taken as definitional that: What is literal
is not metaphorical. The false assumptions and conclusions that usually
accompany the word literal are:
" All everyday conventional language is literal, and none is metaphorical.
" All subject matter can be comprehended literally, without metaphor.
" Only literal language can be contingently true or false.
" All definitions given in the lexicon of a language are literal, not
metaphorical.
" The concepts used in the grammar of a language are all literal; none are
metaphorical.
We will begin with the philosophy of language. The Generalization Commitment
and the Cognitive Commitment are not definitional to the philosophy of language.
Indeed, most philosophers of language would feel no need to abide by them, for a
very good reason. The philosophy of language is typically not seen as an empirical
discipline, constrained by empirical results, such as those that arise by the
application of the Generalization and Cognitive Commitments. Instead, the
philosophy of language is usually seen as an a priori discipline, one which can be
pursued using the tools of philosophical analysis alone, rather than the tools of
empirical research. Therefore, all the evidence that has been brought forth for the
contemporary theory of metaphor simply will not matter for most philosophers of
language. In addition, the philosophy of language comes with its own set of
defining assumptions, which entail many of the false assumptions usually
associated with the word literal. Most practitioners of the philosophy of language
usually make one or more of the following assumptions.
" The correspondence theory of truth.
" Meaning is defined in terms of reference and truth.
" Natural language semantics is to be characterized by the mechanisms of
mathematical logic, including model theory. [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl szkicerysunki.xlx.pl
entities in a source domain and entities in a target domain.
" When those fixed correspondences are activated, mappings can project
source domain inference patterns onto target domain inference patterns.
" Metaphorical mappings obey the Invariance Principle: The image-schema
structure of the source domain is projected onto the target domain in a way
that is consistent with inherent target domain structure.
" Mappings are not arbitrary, but grounded in the body and in everyday
experience and knowledge.
" A conceptual system contains thousands of conventional metaphorical
mappings, which form a highly structured subsystem of the conceptual
system.
" There are two types of mappings: conceptual mappings and image-
mappings; both obey the Invariance Principle.
Some Aspects of Metaphor
" The system of conventional conceptual metaphor is mostly unconscious,
automatic, and is used with no noticeable effort, just like our linguistic
system and the rest of our conceptual system.
" Our system of conventional metaphor is alive in the same sense that our
system of grammatical and phonological rules is alive; namely, it is
constantly in use, automatically and below the level of consciousness.
" Our metaphor system is central to our understanding of experience and to
the way we act on that understanding.
" Conventional mappings are static correspondences, and are not, in
themselves, algorithmic in nature. However, this by no means rules out the
possibility that such static correspondences might be used in language
processing that involves sequential steps.
" Metaphor is mostly based on correspondences in our experiences, rather
than on similarity.
" The metaphor system plays a major role in both the grammar and lexicon
of a language.
" Metaphorical mappings vary in universality; some seem to be universal,
others are widespread, and some seem to be culture- specific.
" Poetic metaphor is, for the most part, an extension of our everyday,
conventional system of metaphorical thought.
These are the conclusions that best fit the empirical studies of metaphor conducted
over the past decade or so. Though much of it is inconsistent with traditional
views, it is by no means all new, and some ideas-e.g., that abstract concepts are
comprehended in terms of concrete concepts-have a long history.
Concluding Remarks
The evidence supporting the contemporary theory of metaphor is voluminous and
grows larger each year as more research in the field is done. The evidence, as we
saw above, comes from five domains:
" Generalizations over polysemy
" Generalization over inference patterns
" Generalizations over extensions to poetic cases
" Generalizations over semantic change
" Psycholinguistic experiments
I have discussed only a handful of examples of the first three of these, hopefully
enough to make the reader curious about the field. But evidence is convincing
only if it can count as evidence. When does evidence fail to be evidence?
Unfortunately, all too often. It is commonly the case that certain fields of inquiry
are defined by assumptions that rule out the possibility of counterevidence. When
a defining assumption of a field comes up against evidence, the evidence usually
loses: the practitioners of the field must ignore the evidence if they want to keep
the assumptions that define the field they are committed to. Part of what makes the
contemporary theory of metaphor so interesting is that the evidence for it
contradicts the defining assumptions of so many academic disciplines. In my
opinion, this should make one doubt the defining assumptions of all those
disciplines. The reason is this: The defining assumptions of the contemporary
theory of metaphor are minimal. There are only two. The Generalization
Commitment: To seek generalizations in all areas of language, including
polysemy, patterns of inference, novel metaphor, and semantic change. The
Cognitive Commitment: To take experimental evidence seriously. But these are
nothing more than commitments to the scientific study of language and the mind.
No initial commitment is made as to the form of an answer to the question of what
is metaphor. However, the defining assumptions of other fields do often entail a
commitment about the form of an answer to that question. It is useful, in an
interdisciplinary volume of this sort, to spell out exactly what those defining
assumptions are, since they will often explain why different authors reach such
different conclusions about the nature of metaphor.
Literal Meaning Commitments
I started this Chapter with a list of the false assumptions about literal meaning that
are commonly made. These assumptions are, of course, false only relative to the
kinds of evidence that supports the contemporary theory of metaphor. If one
ignores all such evidence, then the assumptions can be maintained without
contradiction. Assumptions about literality are the locus of many of the
contradictions between the contemporary theory of metaphor and various
academic disciplines. Let us review those assumptions. In the discussion of literal
meaning given above, I observed that it is taken as definitional that: What is literal
is not metaphorical. The false assumptions and conclusions that usually
accompany the word literal are:
" All everyday conventional language is literal, and none is metaphorical.
" All subject matter can be comprehended literally, without metaphor.
" Only literal language can be contingently true or false.
" All definitions given in the lexicon of a language are literal, not
metaphorical.
" The concepts used in the grammar of a language are all literal; none are
metaphorical.
We will begin with the philosophy of language. The Generalization Commitment
and the Cognitive Commitment are not definitional to the philosophy of language.
Indeed, most philosophers of language would feel no need to abide by them, for a
very good reason. The philosophy of language is typically not seen as an empirical
discipline, constrained by empirical results, such as those that arise by the
application of the Generalization and Cognitive Commitments. Instead, the
philosophy of language is usually seen as an a priori discipline, one which can be
pursued using the tools of philosophical analysis alone, rather than the tools of
empirical research. Therefore, all the evidence that has been brought forth for the
contemporary theory of metaphor simply will not matter for most philosophers of
language. In addition, the philosophy of language comes with its own set of
defining assumptions, which entail many of the false assumptions usually
associated with the word literal. Most practitioners of the philosophy of language
usually make one or more of the following assumptions.
" The correspondence theory of truth.
" Meaning is defined in terms of reference and truth.
" Natural language semantics is to be characterized by the mechanisms of
mathematical logic, including model theory. [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]