[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
theories as likely as other hypotheses. As for the recent discovery al-
luded to by Sinnott-Armstrong that the cosmic expansion is acceler-
ating rather than decelerating, this startling development supports the
beginning of the universe by further undermining the old oscillating
model, since an accelerating expansion cannot reverse under the force
of gravitation into a Big Crunch, but will proceed endlessly.
2. Theism cannot explain the origin of the universe. Notice that this
objection is irrelevant to the truth of the second premise, that the
universe began to exist. It is actually a criticism of my subsequent
argument for the personhood of the First Cause. But let s go ahead
and deal with it here. From the two premises, it follows that the uni-
verse has a cause. But is that cause personal or impersonal? Sinnott-
Armstrong agrees that an impersonal, timeless cause cannot give rise
to a temporal effect like the universe. But, he insists, neither can a
personal cause, because no coherent doctrine of God s relationship
to time can be formulated. I claimed, God existing alone without
the universe is either (i) before the Big Bang, not in physical time,
but in an undifferentiated metaphysical time or else (ii) strictly
timeless but . . . He enters into time at the moment of creation.
Sinnott-Armstrong objects to (i) because then there was after all
some kind of time before the Big Bang. That s right; but this im-
plication is scientifically inconsequential, since such a time would be
a metaphysical reality that physical cosmology does not study. Hence,
its existence would contradict no scientific evidence or theory. As
for (ii), he objects that a being that is strictly timeless by its very
nature can never enter into time. This response illicitly presupposes
that God s temporal status is an essential, rather than contingent,
property of God, which is not incumbent upon the traditional the-
ist. If God is contingently temporal or atemporal (as I happen to
think), then His entering into time is not incompatible with His na-
ture. For more on this very important issue, see our discussion of
The Problem of Action in chapters 4 6.
Since my cosmological argument is a deductive argument, Sinnott-
Armstrong s final animadversions concerning inductive arguments
are irrelevant.
62 God?
Teleological Argument
My second reason, that God Makes Sense of the Fine-Tuning of the
Universe for Intelligent Life, is a form of the teleological argument.
Sinnott-Armstrong treats it in section 5 of his response. Let s exam-
ine each of its premises.
1. The Fine-Tuning of the Universe Is Due to Either
Law, Chance, or Design
This first premise presupposes that the universe is in fact fine-tuned
for intelligent, carbon-based life and states the three possible ex-
planations of this fact. Sinnott-Armstrong is skeptical that the uni-
verse is fine-tuned in the way that I describe. He is suspicious of the
probabilities involved because, he claims, we have no non-arbitrary
way of counting the total number of values that a constant or quan-
tity could assume, nor the range of values that are life-permitting.
This denial of the fact of fine-tuning is remarkable. Otherwise sober
cosmologists are not beating one another out the back door to adopt
metaphysically speculative scenarios of a World Ensemble for no
good reason! As for Sinnott-Armstrong s misgivings, the range of life-
permitting values can in many cases be confidently established be-
cause if the values were allowed to vary beyond a certain restricted
range, neither stars nor planets could exist (not to speak of biologi-
cal organisms) and in some cases none but the lightest elements and
in certain cases not even matter itself.14 As for estimating the range
of possible values that the various constants and quantities might
assume, we may take as our limit those values that are universe-
permitting.15 For example, if gravity were to have a value 10100 times
its present value, there wouldn t even be a universe, but a mere sin-
gularity. Thus, we needn t worry about the range of possible values
extending to infinity. When you compare the range of possible val-
ues of the fundamental quantities permitted by the laws of nature
with the range of life-permitting values, you find either that the range
of life-permitting values is exceedingly small in comparison with the
wider range of assumable values or else that the actual value of some
constant or quantity falls improbably close to the edge of the life-
permitting range. Well-established cases of this sort of fine-tuning
include the strong force, the weak force, the electromagnetic force,
the gravitational force, the proton-neutron mass ratio, and the cos-
Reason Enough 63
mological constant.16 Fine-tuning is a scientifically established fact
of nature that must be squarely faced.
Premise (1) states that there are only three alternatives available
for explaining this remarkable fine-tuning: physical law, chance, or
design. In his discussion, Sinnott-Armstrong tacitly admits that these
are the only three alternatives. For of the several competing alter-
natives that he says are available to explain fine-tuning namely, [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl szkicerysunki.xlx.pl
theories as likely as other hypotheses. As for the recent discovery al-
luded to by Sinnott-Armstrong that the cosmic expansion is acceler-
ating rather than decelerating, this startling development supports the
beginning of the universe by further undermining the old oscillating
model, since an accelerating expansion cannot reverse under the force
of gravitation into a Big Crunch, but will proceed endlessly.
2. Theism cannot explain the origin of the universe. Notice that this
objection is irrelevant to the truth of the second premise, that the
universe began to exist. It is actually a criticism of my subsequent
argument for the personhood of the First Cause. But let s go ahead
and deal with it here. From the two premises, it follows that the uni-
verse has a cause. But is that cause personal or impersonal? Sinnott-
Armstrong agrees that an impersonal, timeless cause cannot give rise
to a temporal effect like the universe. But, he insists, neither can a
personal cause, because no coherent doctrine of God s relationship
to time can be formulated. I claimed, God existing alone without
the universe is either (i) before the Big Bang, not in physical time,
but in an undifferentiated metaphysical time or else (ii) strictly
timeless but . . . He enters into time at the moment of creation.
Sinnott-Armstrong objects to (i) because then there was after all
some kind of time before the Big Bang. That s right; but this im-
plication is scientifically inconsequential, since such a time would be
a metaphysical reality that physical cosmology does not study. Hence,
its existence would contradict no scientific evidence or theory. As
for (ii), he objects that a being that is strictly timeless by its very
nature can never enter into time. This response illicitly presupposes
that God s temporal status is an essential, rather than contingent,
property of God, which is not incumbent upon the traditional the-
ist. If God is contingently temporal or atemporal (as I happen to
think), then His entering into time is not incompatible with His na-
ture. For more on this very important issue, see our discussion of
The Problem of Action in chapters 4 6.
Since my cosmological argument is a deductive argument, Sinnott-
Armstrong s final animadversions concerning inductive arguments
are irrelevant.
62 God?
Teleological Argument
My second reason, that God Makes Sense of the Fine-Tuning of the
Universe for Intelligent Life, is a form of the teleological argument.
Sinnott-Armstrong treats it in section 5 of his response. Let s exam-
ine each of its premises.
1. The Fine-Tuning of the Universe Is Due to Either
Law, Chance, or Design
This first premise presupposes that the universe is in fact fine-tuned
for intelligent, carbon-based life and states the three possible ex-
planations of this fact. Sinnott-Armstrong is skeptical that the uni-
verse is fine-tuned in the way that I describe. He is suspicious of the
probabilities involved because, he claims, we have no non-arbitrary
way of counting the total number of values that a constant or quan-
tity could assume, nor the range of values that are life-permitting.
This denial of the fact of fine-tuning is remarkable. Otherwise sober
cosmologists are not beating one another out the back door to adopt
metaphysically speculative scenarios of a World Ensemble for no
good reason! As for Sinnott-Armstrong s misgivings, the range of life-
permitting values can in many cases be confidently established be-
cause if the values were allowed to vary beyond a certain restricted
range, neither stars nor planets could exist (not to speak of biologi-
cal organisms) and in some cases none but the lightest elements and
in certain cases not even matter itself.14 As for estimating the range
of possible values that the various constants and quantities might
assume, we may take as our limit those values that are universe-
permitting.15 For example, if gravity were to have a value 10100 times
its present value, there wouldn t even be a universe, but a mere sin-
gularity. Thus, we needn t worry about the range of possible values
extending to infinity. When you compare the range of possible val-
ues of the fundamental quantities permitted by the laws of nature
with the range of life-permitting values, you find either that the range
of life-permitting values is exceedingly small in comparison with the
wider range of assumable values or else that the actual value of some
constant or quantity falls improbably close to the edge of the life-
permitting range. Well-established cases of this sort of fine-tuning
include the strong force, the weak force, the electromagnetic force,
the gravitational force, the proton-neutron mass ratio, and the cos-
Reason Enough 63
mological constant.16 Fine-tuning is a scientifically established fact
of nature that must be squarely faced.
Premise (1) states that there are only three alternatives available
for explaining this remarkable fine-tuning: physical law, chance, or
design. In his discussion, Sinnott-Armstrong tacitly admits that these
are the only three alternatives. For of the several competing alter-
natives that he says are available to explain fine-tuning namely, [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]