[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
favor it. Men favor the bomb by a decisive 56 to 32 percent, but women oppose it by 43 to 32
percent. Conservatives support it, while liberals don t.
The American people are also divided over many of the arguments that have been used to
justify the bomb, although some positions are more acceptable than others:
" A 48 to 21 percent plurality agrees that the neutron bomb is the most effective defense in
Western Europe for NATO against the threat of an attack by the Russians.
" By 45 to 34 percent, a plurality also believes the neutron bomb is desirable, because it
99
Washington Post, July 20, 1977, page #A-22.
100
Manchester Guardian, July 24, 1977, page #7.
101
Ibid.
102
U.S. News and World Report, July 25, 1977, page #24.
103
Chicago Tribune, August 2, 1977, page #7.
104
New York Times, July 29, 1977, page #1.
105
Houston Chronicle, August 2, 1977, page #1.
- 49 -
can be limited in its use against troops and not against civilian populations .
" By a much narrower margin of 39 to 33 percent, a plurality agrees that the neutron
bomb is such an effective deterrent that it will actually reduce the threat of war in Europe if it is
given to NATO for use in its defense .
Although a plurality comes down in favor of building the neutron bomb, substantial
numbers of the American people have real reservations about it:
" By 66 to 15 percent, a sizable majority agrees that the neutron bomb can lead to the use
of other nuclear weapons and total destruction.
" By 47 to 26 percent, a plurality also feels that the neutron bomb will more likely be
used by field commanders as a substitute for conventional warfare, and that is wrong .106
On August 15 White House Press Secretary Jody Powell announced that President
Carter would not make a decision on production and deployment until September so that
be would have the opportunity to consult further with NATO. National Security Council
spokesman Jerrold Schecter added that a Pentagon study on the subject had just been
received by the NSC and was undergoing review.107
What that study may have contained was publicized in the New York Times five days
later. According to C.L. Sulzberger, some NATO members had quietly indicated approval
of U.S. plans for production and deployment despite public opposition in their countries.
Their opinion was that, in the event of an invasion, neutron weapons might offer the
opportunity for swift civilian evacuation and military retreat, followed by the chance to
destroy invading forces without rendering the invaded territory useless for reoccupation.108
From Capitol Hill the most notable response to the White House August 15
announcement was a telegram to the President from five Senators and twenty-six
Representatives on August 24, asking that production and deployment plans for the bomb
be halted. The telegram contained no argument that had not already been made,
emphasizing primarily the risk of escalating nuclear exchange as a consequence of the
bomb s deployment. Hatfield was the only Republican to sign the telegram, and, if
anything, it was probably interpreted by the White House as an indication of how weak the
anti-neutron forces on the Hill had become, at least in the absence of some further
provocation.109
On August 27 there was an anti-neutron bomb demonstration at the Pentagon, but,
despite the arrest of four persons involved, it did not elicit much public attention or
interest.110
In due course the provocation appeared. By the last week in September the Carter
Administration had still not achieved the consensus from the NATO allies it had hoped for,
and the President had made no further move toward announcing a decision. As the month
drew to a close, Representative Theodore Weiss and eleven other Democratic liberals
introduced a, bill in the House to eliminate the neutron bomb funds from the ERDA
authorization bill. When the news about the neutron bomb first broke in June, of course,
the ERDA bill had already gone through the House without the ER question being raised
[much to the House s subsequent embarrassment]. Now, it would seem, the controversial
weapon would undergo the floor test that it had missed earlier.
106
Washington Post, August 22, 1977, page #A-7.
107
New York Times, August 17, 1977, page #6.
108
New York Times, August 20, 1977, page #21.
109
A synopsis of the telegram, together with the names of the Senators and Representatives signing it, was released by United [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl szkicerysunki.xlx.pl
favor it. Men favor the bomb by a decisive 56 to 32 percent, but women oppose it by 43 to 32
percent. Conservatives support it, while liberals don t.
The American people are also divided over many of the arguments that have been used to
justify the bomb, although some positions are more acceptable than others:
" A 48 to 21 percent plurality agrees that the neutron bomb is the most effective defense in
Western Europe for NATO against the threat of an attack by the Russians.
" By 45 to 34 percent, a plurality also believes the neutron bomb is desirable, because it
99
Washington Post, July 20, 1977, page #A-22.
100
Manchester Guardian, July 24, 1977, page #7.
101
Ibid.
102
U.S. News and World Report, July 25, 1977, page #24.
103
Chicago Tribune, August 2, 1977, page #7.
104
New York Times, July 29, 1977, page #1.
105
Houston Chronicle, August 2, 1977, page #1.
- 49 -
can be limited in its use against troops and not against civilian populations .
" By a much narrower margin of 39 to 33 percent, a plurality agrees that the neutron
bomb is such an effective deterrent that it will actually reduce the threat of war in Europe if it is
given to NATO for use in its defense .
Although a plurality comes down in favor of building the neutron bomb, substantial
numbers of the American people have real reservations about it:
" By 66 to 15 percent, a sizable majority agrees that the neutron bomb can lead to the use
of other nuclear weapons and total destruction.
" By 47 to 26 percent, a plurality also feels that the neutron bomb will more likely be
used by field commanders as a substitute for conventional warfare, and that is wrong .106
On August 15 White House Press Secretary Jody Powell announced that President
Carter would not make a decision on production and deployment until September so that
be would have the opportunity to consult further with NATO. National Security Council
spokesman Jerrold Schecter added that a Pentagon study on the subject had just been
received by the NSC and was undergoing review.107
What that study may have contained was publicized in the New York Times five days
later. According to C.L. Sulzberger, some NATO members had quietly indicated approval
of U.S. plans for production and deployment despite public opposition in their countries.
Their opinion was that, in the event of an invasion, neutron weapons might offer the
opportunity for swift civilian evacuation and military retreat, followed by the chance to
destroy invading forces without rendering the invaded territory useless for reoccupation.108
From Capitol Hill the most notable response to the White House August 15
announcement was a telegram to the President from five Senators and twenty-six
Representatives on August 24, asking that production and deployment plans for the bomb
be halted. The telegram contained no argument that had not already been made,
emphasizing primarily the risk of escalating nuclear exchange as a consequence of the
bomb s deployment. Hatfield was the only Republican to sign the telegram, and, if
anything, it was probably interpreted by the White House as an indication of how weak the
anti-neutron forces on the Hill had become, at least in the absence of some further
provocation.109
On August 27 there was an anti-neutron bomb demonstration at the Pentagon, but,
despite the arrest of four persons involved, it did not elicit much public attention or
interest.110
In due course the provocation appeared. By the last week in September the Carter
Administration had still not achieved the consensus from the NATO allies it had hoped for,
and the President had made no further move toward announcing a decision. As the month
drew to a close, Representative Theodore Weiss and eleven other Democratic liberals
introduced a, bill in the House to eliminate the neutron bomb funds from the ERDA
authorization bill. When the news about the neutron bomb first broke in June, of course,
the ERDA bill had already gone through the House without the ER question being raised
[much to the House s subsequent embarrassment]. Now, it would seem, the controversial
weapon would undergo the floor test that it had missed earlier.
106
Washington Post, August 22, 1977, page #A-7.
107
New York Times, August 17, 1977, page #6.
108
New York Times, August 20, 1977, page #21.
109
A synopsis of the telegram, together with the names of the Senators and Representatives signing it, was released by United [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]